Year Of Change

THE YEAR OF CHANGE

THE HEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPORTMENT

Building a police organization that can dramatically reduce crime, disorder and fear.

Rudolph W. Giuliani William J. Bratton

Mayor of the City of New York Police Commissioner

TAKING HOLD

A progress report on the crime
control strategies of the NYPD.

MEETING THE
TRAINING CHALLENGE

The importance of training.

THE YEAR OF

CHANGE

Building a police organization that can dramatically reduce crime, disorder and fear.

I wi I any New Yorkers have some
■LJtamfcJj inkling that there are changes
HBHEmW afoot in the NYPD. but few
people outside police circles grasp just
how sweeping these changes are. When
he came to office in 1 994, Mayor Giuliani
made law enforcement and policing a
cornerstone of his administration. In
effect, the Mayor changed the definition
of success for the police department and
set us a much higher standard of
achievement. Instead of being satisfied
with die incremental declines in crime we
had achieved in the previous diree years,
we set the mission of dramatically
reducing crime, disorder, and fear
throughout the city.

We made substantial progress towards
the Mayor's goal in 1994. Felony crime
fell by 1 2 percent, the latest drop in more
than 20 years. There were steep declines
m homicides, shootings, and robberies —
crimes that are the key indicators of the
level of violence in our city. Homicides
fell by more than 1 8 percent, the sharpest
decline in the murder rate in the city "s
lustory. Three hundred and sixty fewer
people have been killed this year than last
and nearly 900 fewer people have been
shot. As our strategics took hold in the
latter part the year, we cut homicides bv
32 percent in September. 46 percent in
October, by 28 percent in November, and
by a preliminary 34 percent in December.

Mayor Giuliani made law
enforcement and policing a

cornerstone of his
administration. In effect,
the Mayor changed the
definition of success for the
police department and set us
a much higher standard of
achievement

These results reflect our initial changes
in the NYPD s strategy and organization,
a refocusing of the department on its core
mission of fighting crime, disorder, and
fear. If we want to make the trend last,
however, we are convinced that we have
to do more. That's why we spent a lot of
time and effort in 1994 working on a
project we call "Reengineering the
NYPD/' We borrowed the term from the
corporate world, where thorough
reorganizations and restructurings have
become commonplace in the lean 1990s.
We decided that the NYPD needed the
same kind of comprehensive approach
that has done so much for companies like
GE and Johnson & Johnson.

Under recngineering. we've taken an in-
depth look at our operations from top to

bottom. Twelve reengineering teams
included police officers and department
civilians of every rank, as well as talented
outsiders from the business world and
academia. They opened every can of
worms and looked under every rock. The
bad news is that there is a lot in the NYPD
that needs fixing. But there also is very
good news. If we can fix what's broken
and get the department performing up to
its potential, then our ability to reduce
crime, disorder, and fear will be just about
unlimited.

This report includes the following
subsections: "Taking Hold," an update
on the the NYPD's enme control strategies
and their impact in 1994;
"Renengineering the New York City
Police Department," an account of the
steps we're taking to to build a police
organization that is capable of
dramaticially reducing crime, disorder,
and fear; and "Meeting the Training
Challenge." a review of the training and
communications initiatives that will help
achieve a lasting impact on the culture of
the NYPD in the 1990s. The year 1994
was a year of change. We're planning to
make 1995, which happens to be the
150th anniversary of the NYPD, its best
vear ever.

Page /• January 1995 • The New York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

Taking Hold

A Progress Report on the Crime
Control Strategies of the NYPD

Since January 1994, the NYPD has been engaged in an all-out
effort to refocus the department's resources on its core mission of
fighting crime, disorder, and fear. We have adopted five
crime control strategies dealing with guns, youth violence, drugs,
domestic violence, and public disorder. Each strategy includes a
comprehensive analysis of how the department has been employing its police
resources and each provides a blueprint for how these resources can be better
marshaled to have a real and lasting impact.

The strategies had a significant impact in 1994, with felony crime falling 12
percent, the steepest drop in more than 20 years. Homicides were down
more than 18 percent, the largest drop in New York City history. Shootings
and robberies, key indicators of the level of violence in our city, were each
down by more than 15 percent. It was the first year ever that the NYPD
recorded double-digit drops in both homicides and robberies.

i For the NYPD, the crime control strategies are not merely an assem-
blage of new tactics. They are a new way of doing business. The strate-
gies are breaking down the barriers that have separated the Patrol Bu-
reau, the Detective Bureau, and the Organized Crime Control Bureau.
They are energizing our precinct commands by giving them new responsi-
bilities and a bigger piece of the crime fighting action. The strategies are
guiding and prioritizing our investigative work so that we are not merely
closing individual cases but also achieving a cumulative impact on crime
problems like guns, drugs, and youth violence. They are focusing police
resources on problems we have long neglected, like domestic violence
and public disorder. Best of all, the strategies are working. The sense
that we can make a difference, that we can win, is spreading in the
department and in the city.

For the NYPD,
the crime
control
strategies are
not merely an
assemblage of
new tactics.
They are a new
way of doing
business.

Page 2* January 1995 • The N&v York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

NYPD Strategy No. 1

Getting Guns of the Streets of New York City

The NYPD gun
strategy uses
felony arrests
and even
summonses to
open a window
on gun
trafficking in
the city.

With as many as two million illegal guns in circulation in New York City,
there were 1,500 gun deaths in 1993, 20 times the number in 1960. There
were also 5,000 people wounded in shootings. Ninety percent of the guns
seized in New York were originally purchased in other states, creating a
major challenge for a local law enforcement agency.

The NYPD gun strategy uses felony arrests and even summonses to open a
window on gun trafficking in the city. We are pursuing every perpetrator
and accomplice in gun crimes and we are interrogating them all about how
the gun was purchased so we can pursue the gun traffickers as well. We
are also developing cases by asking people brought to the precinct house
for minor offenses if they know where guns can be purchased. Because
guns and drugs are parallel problems, we have replaced specialized drug
units with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who go after both. We are
working with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to better
monitor federally licensed gun dealers in New York and to combat inter-
state gun trafficking.

Measured by the damage guns do, the gun strategy has been very effective
in 1994. There were 360 fewer people killed and nearly 900 fewer people
wounded than in 1993. The homicide results for the last four moths of
1994 showed a strong downward trend as the gun strategy took hold, with
murders down 32 percent in September, 46 percent in October, 28 percent
in November, and a preliminary 34 percent in December. There have been
some interesting success stories. A drinking summons led to a person
wanted on a warrant who led us to a gun dealer. A car thief we
aprrehended turned in a fence who turned in a father-and-son gun-dealing
team. We have helped federal authorities make arrests as far away as Texas
and Colorado to break operations that were mailing guns toNew York City.
In all, we've identified and arrested more than 200 gun dealers and confis-
cated their weapons caches.

Page 3* January 1995 • The NeM> York City Police Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

NYPD Strategy No. 2

Curbing Youth Violence in Hie Schools and on the Streets

The NYPD
youth violence
strategy
concentrates
police resources
on the exploding
problem of
youth crime.

Although New York City's juvenile population declined by 25 percent
between 1972 and 1990, youth murder arrests were up four times in same
period, youth assault arrests were up three times, and youth robbery arrests
more than doubled. Schools themselves have become a locus of crime,
with reports of armed students commonplace. Fifteen percent of students,
or 150,000 kids were absent from school and running the streets each day
in 1993, as likely to be victims as perpetrators.

The NYPD youth violence strategy concentrates police resources on the
exploding problem of youth crime. We have increased the number of
youth officers in the precinct commands, giving us much more follow-up
ability in individual cases and better program oversight. We're preparing
school security plans for every school or school cluster — the most thor-
ough look ever taken at policing and protecting school children in New
York City. The security plans usually include safe corridor posts that
protect kids on their way to and from school. The department is assem-
bling a computerized juvenile crime data base to provide better and more
retrievable information about youth cases and repeat offenders. Truancy
squads, active throughout the city, have returned 18,000 truants to the
school system so far this school year.

Our school safety programs are helping us control youth-on-youth crimes
of opportunity, causing a significant reduction in the amount of crime
committed by the school-age children and as well as in the number of
school-age victims. A safe corridor program around two high schools in
Staten Island, for instance, has cut youth-on-youth robberies from 12 in
first six weeks of school last year to two this year. The increased focus on
youth crime has also prompted some excellent preemptive police work.
Alerted by an informant, anti-crime officers in a precinct in Queens broke
up a major gang fight last summer, arresting 23 members of various gangs,
confiscating two firearms at the scene, and developing information that led
to the recovery of two illegally possessed shotguns.

Page 4* January 1995 • The N<nv York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

NYPD Strategy No. 3

Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York City

NYPD drug
strategy enforces
a zero tolerance
for drug dealing,
bringing
uniformed
officers back
into the war
against drugs.

Drugs and especially crack are a major contributor to New York City
crime. In 1993, 78 percent of all arrestees at Manhattan Central Booking
tested positive for drugs, and 66 percent tested positive for cocaine. 1
Twenty-five percent of all homicides in the city are directly related to
drugs. At the close of 1993, there were more than 12,000 drug dealing
locations, including 7,000 on the streets.

NYPD drug strategy enforces a zero tolerance for drug dealing, bringing
uniformed officers back into the war against drugs. We are using special
units to drive open air drug activity off the streets and close down indoor
drug locations. Officers from the precincts then hold the retaken areas.
We're targeting mid-level dealers much more aggressively and going after
their guns, cash, drugs, and cars, as well as the locations they work out of.
Narcotics arrests are up 27 percent. We confiscated 15,810 pounds of
cocaine in 1994, compared with 7,215 pounds in 1993. We are currently
planning an even more intensive assault on drugs in 1995.

We've watched the strategy take hold in a drug-blighted precinct in Brook-
lyn. Plainclothes officers from Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams flooded
the precinct from January to June, making extensive drug arrests and 179
gun collars. Now, without special resources, the precinct personnel are
maintaining the gains. Shootings are down, robberies are down, and arrests
continue up, despite the decrease in complaints. The precinct is now
taking the next step, having been authorized to investigate and enhance
drug collars that would have been referred to special investigative units in
the past. In just the first three weeks, the precinct has executed four search
warrants, netting substantial amounts of drugs and guns, including two
submachine guns, an assault rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, and a number of
semiautomatic pistols.

Page $• January 1995 • The New York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

NYPD Strategy No. 4

Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence

The NYPD
domestic
violence
strategy is
creating an
early warning
system on
domestic
violence and
providing the
resources to
intervene when
the warning
sounds.

Domestic violence is the great hidden crime problem in New York City. It
is estimated to cause 30 percent of the cases in emergency wards. Women
are six times more likely to be killed in their homes than on the street.
Children who grow up as victims and witnesses of domestic violence are
far more likely to become both domestic abusers and street criminals.

The NYPD domestic violence strategy is creating an early warning system
on domestic violence and providing the resources to intervene when the
warning sounds. We have assigned a domestic violence officer and a
domestic violence investigator in all NYPD precincts. Using a new Do-
mestic Violence Incident Report, filed every time police respond to a
domestic incident, the domestic violence officers can track the history of a
family, identify chronic abuse patterns, and intervene proactively If a
criminal investigation is necessary, the domestic violence investigator is
there to coordinate it. Citywide, we are generating about 3,000 domestic
incident reports a week.

The role of domestic violence officer is attracting some of our most idealis-
tic young cops, people who will use all their skills and imagination to reach
and help women and children in danger. One domestic violence officer
managed to place a woman in a shelter for battered women in Canada to
get her out of the reach of an abusive partner. Another domestic violence
officer, assigned to a precinct in the Bronx, has made numerous arrests
under the program. His reputation for responsiveness and sensitivity
prompted community groups to refer two rape victims to him, victims who
might not have approached the police at all. Both rapists were arrested.

Page 6* January 1995 • The /Ven' York City Police Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

NYPD Strategy No. 5

Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York City

A strategy to deal with street disorder is, in many ways, the linchpin of the
other strategies because it affects people's perception and fear of crihie.
Controlling disorder can also change the behavior of criminals who are less
likely to commit crimes in a well-policed, orderly environment. For more
than 20 years, the NYPD gave a low priority to such offenses as boom-box
radios, street prostitution, underage drinking, squeegee pests, and drag
racing. Any combination of these activities can blight a neighborhood.
Our failure to deal with disorder is one reason why New York, which is
22nd among large cities in reported crime, is probably number one in the
perception and fear of crime.

The NYPD strategy for reclaiming public spaces includes more than a
dozen specific tactics for countering disorder in all its forms. Many tactics
involve the confiscation, closing, or temporary seizure of property whether
a vehicle, a drug paraphernalia shop, or house of prostitution. Our Opera-
tion Losing Proposition confiscates the cars of people who patronize street
prostitutes. Operation Sound Trap uses sound meters to trap boom-box
cars and loud motorcycles and take the vehicles off the street. We're using
nuisance abatement and other civil laws to close down properties where
criminal activities take place. Through steady police presence and arrests
when necessary, we've all but eliminated the squeegee pests who beg by
cleaning windshields.

A strategy to
deal with street
disorder is, in
many ways, the
linchpin of the
other strategies
because it af-
fects people 's
perception and
fear of crime.

Police presence and police pressure can win through against disorder. In a
precinct in eastern Brooklyn, a drag racing problem of 15 years duration
was eradicated by police and Department of Transportation officials who
worked successive Sunday afternoons last spring to tow unlicensed, unin-
sured, and uninspected vehicles. A drag racing area that had attracted
hundreds cars and thousands of bettors was shut down. Neighborhood
residents report the quietest summer in memory.

Page 7* January 1995 • The Ne^v York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

1994 NYC Felony Crime Statistics (with comparisons to 1993) *

COMPLAINTS

Murder

Rape

Robbery

Felony Assault

Burglary

Grand Larceny

Grand Larceny Auto

Total

Shooting Victims
Shooting Incidents

1993

1946.
3226.
85883 .

1994 %Change

1586 -18.34%

3200 -0.81%

....72559 -15.51%

41116 39770 -3.27%

100933 90378 -10.46%

85531 75314 -11.95%

111611 94525 -15.31%

430252

5861
5268

377327 -12.30%

4967 -15.25%

4405 -16.38%

ARRESTS

Murder

Rape

Robbery

Felony Assault

Burglary

Grand Larceny

Grand Larceny Auto

Total

Narcotics Arrests

All NYPD Arrests

(including misdemeanors)

1993 1994 %Change

1243 1266 1.85%

1326 1494 12.67%

25106 25628 2.08%

18964 21624 14.03%

9291 10415 12.10%

11850 11844 -0.05%

6256 5512 -11.89%

74036

65452

203351

77783 5.06%

83451 27.50%

247081 21.50%

"Figures are preliminary and subject to further analusis and revision.

Page 8* January 1995 • The New York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

Reengineering

The New York City
Police Department

Instead of being
satisfied with
incremental
declines in crime,
we set the mission
of dramatically
reducing crime,
disorder, and fear.

Why Reengineering?

Like many private corporations that have chosen to reengineer, the NYPD
was an organization that wasn't living up to its potential. The department
evaluated itself by incremental changes in crime statistics and by various
internal measures that didn't reflect our true performance or our impact on
the public. Although serious crime declined by small percentage amounts in
1991, 1992, and 1993, the department was capable of a far higher perfor-
mance. The organization wasn't being sufficiently challenged.

The NYPD was like a company whose day-to-day operations seem to be
running smoothly until closer examination reveals that it isn't really prepar-
ing for the challenges of the future. The department was losing its sense of
mission, its sense that it could win, and its sense of connection with the
public. To some degree, the public sensed these problems before we did.
New Yorkers were frightened of crime, and no amount of fanfare about a
small drop in felonies would change their view. With our community
policing efforts still in the beginning stages, many people, and especially
minorities, continued to view us as a remote organization whose agenda
had little to do with protecting them or easing their fears.

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani came to office in 1994 determined to make major
improvements in the economy, education, and law enforcement. In effect,
the Mayor changed the definition of success for the police department.
Instead of being satisfied with incremental declines in crime, we set the
mission of dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear. Reengineering
became the means to support that mission, the way we would build an
organization capable of achieving our ambitious goal.

Page 9* January 1995 • The Nov York City Poilce Department

■

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

We are putting the
function of
fighting crime and
disorder front and
center again. We
have established
strategies for using
the full resources
of department to
more effectively
combat guns,
drugs, youth
violence, domestic
violence, and
public disorder.

Strategic Reengineering

Like a corporation that had drifted too far from its core business, the
NYPD had spent very little time thinking strategically about crime and
disorder. Special units worked on pieces of the crime problem, but no one
was seeing it whole. As result, the related problems of guns, drugs, and
youth violence were reaching epidemic proportions in some neighbor-
hoods. In addition, the department had withdrawn, over a 20 year period,
from enforcing public order. It had allowed disorder conditions to develop
in many neighborhoods that emboldened criminals and fed the public's fear.

We are putting the function of fighting crime and disorder front and center
again. We have established strategies for using the full resources of the
department to more effectively combat guns, drugs, youth violence, domes-
tic violence, and public disorder. These strategies cut across department
disciplines and fiefdoms and involve the precinct commands, which had
been kept out of a lot of crime fighting in the past. We are following
through on every gun, drug, and youth gang arrest, interrogating gun
criminals, for instance, about where they got their guns and going after the
illegal gun dealers. We are using crime statistics not just as way of keeping
score at the end of the year but as a way of making day-to-day adjustments
in our tactics. We hold tough, probing, weekly meetings with borough and
precinct commanders and detective squad leaders to energize the command
staff and keep the focus sharp.

We are placing a strong emphasis on public order because an atmosphere
where small crimes go unpunished is atmosphere where fear and serious
crine will thrive. If community policing is to mean anything it must mean
that the police respond to the common complaints from communities about
prostitution, boom-box cars, squeegee pests, drag racing, underage drinking,
and a host of other low level offenses. In one of our most successful cross-
disciplinary efforts, lawyers from the department's legal bureau are working
in the field with precinct commanders. They are using forfeiture and nui-
sance abatement laws to close down houses of prostitution, drug locations,
chop shops, and other properties that are a locus for crime and fear in our
neighborhoods.

Page 10* January 1995 • The NeH> York City Police Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

Like a decentralized
corporation that
allows wide latitude
to the CEOs of its
subsidiaries, we are
creating 76
miniature police
departments within
the NYPD.

Structural and Technological Reengineering

To support our strategies we have to make basic changes in the way we
organize our work. The NYPD is an overspecialized and top heavy organi-
zation that has often failed to perform at the precinct level where we can
do the most to prevent crime. We are also one of the most technologically
bereft organizations of our size and scope anywhere in the United States.

We are reorganizing and restructuring the NYPD with the primary goal of
increasing the authority, resources, and responsibility of the commanders in
the department's 76 precincts. We're going to cut staff at headquarters and
the special units to strengthen the precincts. We're institutionalizing a
precinct-based system of rewards that encourages high performance and
establishes a meaningful career path for patrol officers. We've flattened the
NYPD organizational layer cake by eliminating one whole level of execu-
tive supervison. Like a decentralized corporation that allows wide latitude to
the CEOs of its subsidiaries, we are creating 76 miniature police departments
within the NYPD. The chain of command has been shortened and strength-
ened for the purposes of keeping the department on track strategically, but
most day-to-day operations will be managed at the precinct level. The
community policing focal point in the reengineered NYPD will be the sea-
soned precinct commander not the 25-year-old beat officer.

The NYPD is so backward technologically that we can achieve major
savings and efficiencies if we can just find the capital to make the initial
investment in technology and the expertise to ensure technology that meets
both our current and future needs. Fortunately, in a time of strained munici-
pal budgets, the newly passed federal crime bill offers significant assistance.
It will help fund arrest processing technologies that will shave some 12
hours off the 14 hours NYPD cops spend on the arrest-to-arraignment
process for each arrest. Mobile data terminals in patrol cars and an en-
hanced 911 emergency response system will also add greatly to the effi-
ciency and safety of our operations.

Page 11 • January 1995 • The NeM> York City Police Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

With training
sessions, videos,
newsletters, and
active, walk-around
management, we're
building a culture
of respect in the
NYPD — respect
for each other,
respect for the
people we serve,
and respect for the
great tradition of
our department.

Cultural Reengineering

Imagine a business that delivers a service as complex as policing — requir-
ing a detailed knowledge of the law, coolness in a crises, physical courage,
and the ability to work with all kinds of people. Now recognize that, for
most of the day, there is no practical way to directly supervise the
workforce, who are on solo or dual patrol. Add the fact that a third of the
workforce is under 25 and that most have no military experience or fkmily
police tradition. Now add the unfortunate reality that a small portion of
the workforce is corrupt and may be drawing impressionable young cops
into their web. That's the training challenge — the cultural reengineering
challenge — in the NYPD.

Cultural reengineering starts at the top with tone set by the command staff.
We want active cops but humane cops, cops who take command without
being abusive, cops who confront problems without unnecessarily con-
fronting people. These issues all revolve around the idea of respect. It's
the key cultural concept in policing, and, in some of the tougher neighbor-
hoods, it's the key to survival. With training sessions, videos, newsletters,
and active, walk-around management, we're building a culture of respect in
the NYPD — respect for each other, respect for the people we serve, and
respect for the great tradition of our department.

We are also building a culture of activity. We are unleashing the creativity
and energy of precinct police officers from the dead hand of bureaucratic
procedure which often kept them out of the crime-fighting front lines. By
letting cops be cops, we get tougher, more responsive local policing and
the added benefit that active, effective police officers are less vulnerable to
corruption and police brutality. The precinct house that is the center of an
effective program to combat crime and disorder is not going to be the
precinct where corruption takes hold. We're building a stronger precinct
organization, with a highly focused commander and well-trained and
authoritative front-line supervisors. It's the best way to keep cops active in
the fight against crime and disorder — and the best way to keep them from
committing crimes themselves.

Page 12* January 1995 • The New York City Police Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

We don't have
reengineering
budgets or the
ability to put
people on these
projects full time,
yet we have
established a
quality process
that is producing a
quality result.

The Reengineering Process

While we have adopted the corporate model of reengineering, we don't
have corporate resources. We are constrained not only by a shortage of
municipal funds and the need to cut costs for this year's budget, but also by
civil service law, arcane government procurement practices, and intense
press scrutiny. Nevertheless, we have been able to push forward a very
productive reengineering process. We don't have reengineering budgets or
the ability to put people on these projects full time, yet we have established
a quality process that is producing a quality result.

After two months of intensive work, 12 reengineering teams reported in
the Summer of 1994. The teams included top managers, field command-
ers, supervisory officers, police officers, department civilians, and a number
of outside volunteers who are knowledgeable about police work and
managing large organizations. They studied department procedures,
practices, and policies more thoroughly than at any time in our history. We
had teams on Building Community Partnerships, Geographical vs. Func-
tional Organizational Structure, Precinct Organization, Supervisory Train-
ing, In-Service Training, Productivity, Paperwork, Integrity, Rewards and
Career Paths, Discipline, Equipment and Uniforms, and Technology. The
reengineering process yielded more than 600 recommendations that are currently
being shaped into a Plan of Action. To guard against it being a top-down
document that doesn't reflect the rank and file, the Plan of Action will also
draw upon focus groups conducted with police officers and an opinion
survey completed by nearly 8,000 NYPD cops.

Our lack of fiscal resources is offset by an extraordinarily talented and
dedicated workforce. We have many high-performing individuals in the
NYPD who deserve to working in a high-performing organization. A
primary goal of reengineering is to break down the barriers that block their
creativity and energy and to get them in the game. If we can get 3 1,000
motivated, active cops in the game, then our goal of dramatically reducing
crime, disorder, and fear is as good as accomplished.

Page 13* January 1995 • The Ne^> York City Poilce Department

THE NYPD AGENDA FOR 1995 AND BEYOND

Meeting the Training Challenge

The importance of the training agenda to our overall success cannot be overstated.
Organizational and structural changes in police departments tend to be ineffective in

the absence of underlying cultural change.

The NYPD has what can only be
described as a huge training agenda
for the coming years. Our strategies
are asking a lot of precinct commanders,
front-line supervisors, and the cops in the
field, and we need to train them better for
the task. We are creating training programs
that increase police effectiveness, enhance
police and public safety, and improve polce
attitudes toward the people and the
communities they serve.

Respect

Perhaps the single most important
training programs in 1995 will be major
in-house inititative on the issue of respect.
We will working to increase understanding
and to bridge the "them vs. us" gap that
unfortunately divides so many communities
from their police departments. We also be
conducting very practical training to increase
the communications skills of police officers.
The respect initiative will emphasize the
psychological and verbal tactics to defuse
and de-escalate conflicts and to exert
authority without bullying. In all our
training and communications we will be
heightening police awareness that a
respectful attitude toward the community
and the good feeling it engenders ultimately
protects cops by exposing them to fewer
high-tension situtations. including angry
crowds and people resisting arrest.

Leadership Institute

The plan to enhance the NYPD
Leadership Institute addresses one of the
most important elements in any police
department, the skills of the individuals who
make up the chain of command. Police
departments have always promoted from the
ranks but they have rarely done enough to
prepare promolees for the wider range of
activities and the greatly increased
responsibilities that go with each promotion.
The enhanced NYPD Leadership Institute
will be a vehicle for molding the supervisory
skills of sergeants and lieutenants, the
command skills of precinct commanders,
and the higher management skills of the
highest echelon of NYPD executives.

Combat Simulators

As we continue to police the drug and gun
underworld more aggressively, our officers
will need the sharpest possible combat skills
to protect both themselves and the public.
Computer-driven systems that simulate
combat situations have been shown to be
vastly superior to static range practice in
teaching officers the judgmental skills they
need in the field. These systems teach cops
as much about withholding fire as about
firing. The officers learn how to distinguish
innocent people from criminals and how to
keep control of developing combat
situations.

Driving Simulators

Similar to combat simulators, driving
simulators give officers the chance to make
mistakes and learn from them without
injuring themselves or others. The youthful
officers on today's force share the belief of
young people everywhere in their own
immortality and invincibility behind the
wheel. The simulators will show some of
these "cowboys" 1 that they are not as good as
they think they are and help us teach them
some well-advised caution. As part of a
broader program of auto safety within the
department, the simulators will help us
reduce the vehicle accidents that injure more
than 1.000 police officers each year.

Video Communications

Internal communications is an
important part of changing the culture of
any organization, and this is doubly so in
police departments. We expect that video
will be the centerpiece of our internal
communications efforts over the next
several years. Videos have proven a very
effective way to reach cops with specific
training messages as well as with more
general messages that support morale and
change attitudes. But we can't reach the
television generation with static
productions or traditional-style training
videos. Young cops are too sophisticated
about television for that. We will be

upgrading the equipment and capabilities
of the department's video unit to prbduce
sophisticated video programming that
supports the department's strategic and
training agendas.

150th Anniversary

We plan to use the 150th Anniversary of
the NYPD in 1 995 as a way of building pride
in the department and of focusing today's
cops not only on the history behind them
but also on the mission in front of them. The
150th Anniversary will be a continuing
theme throughout the year, highlighted by a
police parade and other events and
ceremonies. We'll also be using such devices
as exhibits, calendars, videos, brochures,
pins, breast bars, and other memorabilia to
give the year a special sense of significance
and purpose.

Advertising

We intend to use general media
advertising as another way of reaching and
cornmimicating with police officers. General
ad campaigns for police departments are as
important for what they communicate to cops
as they are for what they communicate to
the public. Police officers, who generally
feel underappreciated, like to know that their
story is being told. One of the most effective
morale boosters at the Transit Police in 1 990
and 199 1 was a series of high-profile radio
ads funded by the MTA. Advertising will
help create a real working partnership
between the police and public in driving
down crime, disorder, and fear.

The importance of the training agenda to
our overall success cannot be overstated.
Organizational and structural changes in
police departments tend to be ineffective in
the absence of underlying cultural change.
In 1995 and beyond', the NYPD will be
aiming for genuine cultural change. With
carefully designed and targeted training and
communications efforts, we believe that we
can achiev e a major improvement not only
in the quality of police service but in the
quality of life in New York City.

Page 14 9 January 1995 • The Neyv York City Police Department